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ABSTRACT 
Classical realism describes the notion that the world we inhabit is completely mind-independent, 
that there is one unique account of the world and that truths about the world are a matter of the 
absolute correspondence between linguistic terms and their referents in the world. Human 
geographers hâve recently employed a form of transcendental realism inspired by the works of R. 
Bhaskar, A. Giddens and A. Sayer. This form of realism is anti-positivist and based on the dual 
notions of ontological stratification and émergent powers materialism. Reactions in geography 
hâve been both positive and négative indicating that neither classical realism, nor transcendental 
realism nor anti-realism seem acceptable. As a way of solving this dilemma, pragmatic (or 
internai) realism proposes the adoption of a natural ontological attitude toward the objects of 
geographical inquiry. 
KEY WORDS : Realism, anti-realism, pragmatic realism. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Géographie et réalisme 
Le réalisme classique décrit la notion selon laquelle le monde où nous vivons est entièrement 
indépendant de l'esprit, qu'il n'y a qu'un seul et unique compte rendu du monde et que les vérités 
en ce qui concerne le monde sont de l'ordre de la correspondance absolue existant entre des 
termes linguistiques et leurs référents dans le monde. Les spécialistes en géographie humaine ont 
récemment employé une forme de réalisme transcendantal inspiré des travaux de R. Bhaskar, A. 
Giddens et A. Sayer. Cette forme de réalisme est anti-positiviste et se base sur les notions doubles 
de stratification ontologique et de matérialisme des puissances émergentes. Les réactions en 
géographie ont été à la fois positives et négatives, ce qui indique que ni le réalisme classique, ni le 
réalisme transcendantal, ni l'anti-réalisme ne semblent acceptables. Afin de résoudre ce dilemme, 
le réalisme pragmatique (ou interne) propose l'adoption d'une attitude ontologique naturelle vis-
à-vis les objets de l'enquête géographique. 
MOTS-CLÉS: Réalisme, anti-réalisme, réalisme pragmatique. 
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Does the world consist of some "fixed totality" of objects which are completely 
constituted independently of our existence? Answering in the affirmative is the first 
step toward a broadly realist stance concerning the world and our expériences of it. 
A variant of realism based on the philosophical reflections of M. Hesse, R. Bhaskar, 
R. Harré, A. Giddens and A. Sayer has recently found favour among a wide variety of 
Anglo-American theorists in geography, particularly those concemed with the emerging 
focus on how such social thèmes as class, gender, family, race and ethnicity are 
produced (and reproduced) in spécifie places such as the home, the work place, the 
school, the région and the nation-state1. 
Very broadly, this realist stance is based on the following gênerai tenets: 
1) commitment to the view that expérience is "larger" than the world as we hâve it; 
2) the belief that the limits of our world are not given by the limits of our language; 
3) the notion that for the purposes of the human studies both object-based and event-
based ontologies are limited ; 4) the notion that causality is an émergent property of 
objects; and 5) the belief that mind is a sui generis émergent power of matter (see 
Bhaskar, 1975, 1979, 1986; Harré, 1986). 
While it would do us no great disservice to simply accept the new realism into our 
theorizing about a fully contextual rendering of the social with the spatial, it would 
appear that some of its basic tenets do cry out for further critical examination. The 
reaction of geographers to the realist option has been swift and, at times, punishing. 
But there is an enduring nature to realist thought; there is a certain raw essentialism 
which is présent in ail our inquiries that is informed by realism. To the extent that we 
wish to endorse the new realism, we will hâve to examine this essentialist tendency and 
its implications for the discipline. Whether or not one believes that we can form any 
définitive answer to the larger question of there being some mind-independent reality 
"out there" to which our inquiries are attempting to be adéquate, a whole range of 
responses is still possible within the broad overlap between society, spatiality and 
human geography. One of thèse responses is to employ a pragmatic or "minimal" 
realism in theoretical human geography. 
CONTEXT 
In keeping with the modem attempt to contextualize everything, it may be fair to 
say that even the context of the responses to realism in geography has had a major rôle 
to play. In this sensé the reaction to realism has to be seen as being played out in the 
wider context of post-modern thought in a variety of disciplines from architecture to 
literary criticism to ethnographie studies and cultural anthropology. As some would 
see it, this post-modern context "hâtes metalevel analyses" of any sort, be it metatheory, 
metalanguage or metanarrative (Cooke, 1987). It abjures almost anything transcendental, 
e.g. the hermeneutic movement, the émancipation of a working subject, dialectical 
thought, and so forth, so much so that fragmentation of both thought and theory has 
become excessively glorified. In such a context perhaps even the traditional notions of 
académie debate and critical thought are in danger of being susceptible to "ne who has 
the smoothest tongue or the raciest story" (Eagleton 1986). Perhaps we as geographers 
hâve had the misfortune to engage in such a debate when the whole project of having 
knowledge at ail is in doubt (Rosenberg, 1980; D'Amico, 1988). 
Given this wider context it is not surprising that some outside observers think that 
one reason why realism is popular in geography is that it has become simply the latest 
fashion (Ellen, 1988). Even inside observers will admit that we are presently witnessing 
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the scavenging of social theory in search of some stance which is suitably "post-
modem, post-historical and post-Fordist" (Soja, 1989). Some others within the discipline 
think that the whole gamut of realist thinking can be used to legitimate a new kind of 
immunity for favored beliefs and perhaps even political programmes (Saunders and 
Williams, 1986). But in spite of the prevailing pessimism concerning the ability to 
mount even a modest assessment of the realist programme, there are several reasons 
why realism has gained credibility in human geography. 
In the hands of geographers the realist stance has been used to double advantage. 
First, as a foil against empiricism, realism insists that there must be some ontological 
depth to the social world. Realists such as Bhaskar and Harré postulate several "layers" 
of reality : an actual level of events and actions in the world is underlain by a "real" level 
where unobservable causal mechanisms and structures exist. Thèse mechanisms 
structure the décision making environment of actors in the actual world although they 
do not détermine it in an exact manner. Interprétations of both actor's actions and 
those of observers are key éléments in the realist stance and the overall goal is to 
theorize about thèse interprétations at a third level, the empirical level. At this empirical 
level, an attempt is made to see how the underlying structures at the real level are 
actualized as events in the world and to understand how the practices created at the 
actual level are correctly conceived of as both actual outcomes as well as the média for 
those outcomes (see Johnson, 1983, 1986; Goodall, 1987). As Johnson (1986) has 
pointed out, the realist approach offers several advantages when compared to either 
wholly positivist or wholly idealist approaches. Realism is an interprétative approach 
since meanings are fully incorporated in the analysis. As well, realism is fully wedded to 
the notion of context, thus the création (and récréation) of larger social practices is 
central to the project and realism admits of the fully structural sections of our human 
context, hence it does not promote overly voluntarist notions as would some forms of 
idealism, eg. phenomenology. 
The second part of the double advantage has been the affinity between realist 
stances and Marxist approaches. Although realism, as a philosophy of science, does 
not entail Marxism (Sayer, 1987), realism can be viewed as a reconstitution of dialectical 
materialism (Thrift, 1987) and as a distinct improvementover the earlier social construction 
of reality théories, e.g. those proposed by Alfred Schutz (Berger and Luckmann, 1975). 
Because realism offers a bounded conception of human agency and a distinctive social 
ontology, it has been very useful in the analysis of the changing capitalist modes of 
production, the theory of the state, the analysis of uneven économie development and 
the analysis of landlord-tenant relations (see Sayer, 1982; Gregory, 1982; Massey, 
1984; Morgan and Sayer, 1984; Allen, 1983). In this context realism has become an 
analytical tool for conceptualizing groups which possess intrinsic "causal" powers, i.e. 
groups which structure the social, political and économie environment of everyday 
actors. 
Emphasis in thèse types of analyses has been on revising the gênerai realist 
approach to accommodate whole social Systems, Systems which can be described as 
inherently "open" or unbounded as opposed to "closed" or bounded (see Sayer, 1982, 
1984, 1987; and Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1984). 
THE REALIST QUESTION 
As a way of beginning our délibérations on thèse questions, we might take an 
example from the realist inspired literature in geography2. One group of individuals 
164 CAHIERS DE GÉOGRAPHIE DU QUÉBEC, Vol. 34, no 92, septembre 1990 
who have continuously exhibited power relations in our society is landlords. The 
essential relationship between a landlord and a tenant is given by property rent; this 
relationship would qualify as "necessary" since without it there would be no reason to 
suppose that a connection existed between the two individuals. As Allen (1983) points 
out, when a landlord takes money for rent, he/she is selling the rights to occupy a 
particular space for a particular period of time. Herein lies the essential feature of 
domination, i.e. the direct control over another individual's living conditions. But 
landlords themselves are not free to exact any amount of rent they wish since they act 
only as part of a larger circuit of capital and other sections of the circuit such as banks, 
mortgageholders, maintenanceand repairworkers, utilitycompaniesandsoforthalso 
exist as part of the "historically transferred" conditions in the System as a whole. Hence 
although landlords do possess what realists would term an émergent power to 
dominate, they will not always exercise this power or act uniformly since there exist ail 
manner of other contingent conditions: officiai housing policies, building codes, 
government subsidies, tax variations, légal statute variations, price différences for 
houses and apartments, interest rate variations, and so forth. The resuit is that every 
landlord-tenant relationship, although it does contain an underlying structural property 
which is similar, becomes very unique. Local conditions almost always dictate that a 
landlord who exercises his power to dominate excessively over a long period of time 
will lose his profit-making and revenue-making capabilities and therefore cease to be a 
landlord, by définition. 
How can we see this example as one involving realist concepts? One way to 
reconstruct this example would be to analyze it as a proposition about certain types of 
statements that we are prepared, or not prepared, to accept. For example, a realist 
version of the postulation of a mechanism for the landlord-tenant relation might be : 
if, and only if, some event E would not have occurred except for the opération of X, 
and X did occur, 
then, one is justified in saying, "X is a cause of E" whether or not one knows the 
nature of the connection between X and E (see Bhaskar, 1979, p. 129). 
So if E is taken to be an increase in the tenant's rent, then X could be said to be the 
tendency, say, of landlords to pass along the increased costs of taxes, utilities, repairs, 
insurance, etc. to tenants so as to at least hold constant the profit margin (from each 
tenant or the net profit margin considering ail tenants). Other examples of realist 
inspired theorizing can be given which are more central to the concerns of human 
geography: in social geography if E was the déniai of mortgage funds to certain 
prospective borrowers by particular lenders (i.e. "redlining"), X might be taken to be 
some mechanism of distanciation and the résultant spatial outcome (a homogeneous 
residential area) might be some form of nodality (Darden, 1980). In political geography 
E could be the décision of some local state to privatize some previously public service 
and X could be taken as some mechanism of hegemony or control and the spatial 
outcome some expression of the territorial behavior of political Systems (Laws, 1989). 
And in économie geography a pertinent example might be that E is the décision to 
close a manufacturing facility, X is the mechanism of flexible accumulation and the 
spatial outcome is the migration of jobs and capital out of some particular région (Scott 
andStorper, 1986). In ail of thèses cases Eoccurs in the actual domain butfor Bhaskar 
X exists in the domain of the real and is not observable, only its manifestations (in the 
actual domain) are observable. Bhaskar would recognize that satisfaction of the 
condition "X did occur" does not guarantee the occurrence of the event since ail 
manner of other conditions might prevent the landlord from acting according to the 
tendency announced in the mechanism. For example, a rent ceiling or limit in rate 
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increase imposed by an outside agency could prevent E from occurring even though X 
was présent. But none of this affects the analysis at ail given the caveat "whether or not 
one knows..." It is therefore at the level of what the statements refer to that we will hâve 
to try to grasp the nature of the realist stance. On this question exactly, Bhaskar is 
unequivocal : "what is real" and "what is sayable" or "knowable" is not a homologous 
relation. Thus objects, things and whole practices can remain at a conceptual level ; 
they can remain as meanings, as reasons, as supposed rules or routines and they can 
remain independent of our attempts to describe it or them. Saying that "X did occur" 
and "could be said to be an émergent power" is a judgement, but such a judgement can 
be as accurate as the assertion of any truth in the actual world. There are two extrêmes 
hère: for the strong-minded realist, X never refers just to reality, (a property or 
characteristic of this very world), but always to REALITY, (an ultimate something to be 
perceived perfectly like TRUTH or GOODNESS). For the anti-realist, things and 
relations are real only in relation to other statements, relations and judgements ; X can 
exist as long as he/she can feel justified in believing that it does and this justification is 
consistent with the rest of his/her currently held beliefs about landlords, tenants, the 
nature of the rental market and so forth. For a cohérent realist human geography, it is a 
position somewhere between the two that we want. 
FORMS OF REALISM 
In the classical sensé, realism describes the notion that the world we inhabit is 
completely mind-independent and that universals do hâve real objective existence. In 
more modem usage, realism describes the view that material objects exist independently 
of our sensé expériences. Both usages of the term contrast with idealism and pheno-
menalism; in the first instance since idealist thought insists that there cannot be 
material objects or external realities existing apart from our consciousness of them and 
in the second instance because a phenomenalist would be persuaded that material 
objects exist only as groups of sensa, actual or possible3. 
As a doctrine about what sort of things exist in the world, realism concerns itself 
explicitly with metaphysics. G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein ail held 
that we can think and talk about things as they "actually" are and we can do this by 
virtue of a "correspondence" relation between the terms in our language and the sorts 
of mind independent entities which are supposed to exist. For them metaphysics were 
seen then as the task of describing the "furniture of the world", what sorts of things and 
entities we should believe do exist. Metaphysical realism amounts to holding that: 
1) the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects; 2) there is 
exactly one true and complète description of the way the world is; and 3) that truth 
involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought signs and 
external things and sets of things (Putnam, 1981, p. 49). Over against this "maximal" 
metaphysical realism, we hâve ail manner of anti-realist responses: non-realism, 
internai realism, intuitive (or naive) realism, minimal realism, mitigated realism, policy 
realism and tepid realism (see Harré, 1986; Putnam, 1983; Wright, 1987). What 
characterizes ail of thèse responses is their rejection of the notion of correspondence 
between the terms in our language and the mind-independent entities in the world 
which the terms are supposed to describe. In its place, most anti-realist stances accept 
the notion of a cohérence of our beliefs with each other and with our expériences as 
thèse expériences themselves are represented in our belief System. On this view, truth 
names a relationship we believe to be the case within a particular discourse. Since 
there is not "complète description of the way the world is", no external perspective to 
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be had, there are only the various "points of view" or "multiple accounts" of actual 
individuals reflecting various interests and théories at their disposai (Putnam 1981, 
1983, 1987). So what émerges is a very broad multi-facetted spectrum with maximal 
metaphysical realism at oneend, then perhaps varioussemi-realist or "mixed" positions 
in the middle ground, e.g. internai realism and policy realism and then completely 
phenomenalist positions at the other extrême. 
On the whole, the realism of the type now popular in human geography does hâve 
some similarities to a scientific realism on the questions of the gênerai standards of 
scientific inquiry, the notions of rationality, objectivity and the importance of évidence. 
But the new realism in geography is, by most accounts, not an empirical realism, it is a 
transcendental realism, that is, it is not just based on what investigators find the 
empirical world to consist of but its catégories or existents are based on what the world 
would hâve to be //'/ce if certain known processes are to be explained (Gregory, 1982 ; 
Allen, 1987). 
Bhaskar proposes that, if one accepts the view, against positivism and empiricism, 
that expérience is larger than the world and further, against Winch, that the limits to our 
language do not define the limits to our world, then one can avoid the two-fold 
réduction of statements about being to statements about knowledge (the réduction of 
ontology to epistemology) and the further réduction of epistemological questions to 
statements about the properties of our language. This done, one is free to postulate 
that there can be notions of being or world which are free of our thinking entirely. 
Science itself investigates at least some transcendent entities, e.g. électrons, magnetic 
fields, and quarks can be regarded as legitimate objects of investigation. But this 
transcendence is contingent on the world as we know it since, for the most part we are 
confronted with open Systems, Systems in which ail manner of connections between 
events may escape our theorizing altogether. For Bhaskar, 1) the world exhibits a 
stratified ontology : there is not one domain of existents, there are three : the empirical, 
the actual and the real. The relationship between the domains, in conventional terms, 
is : DR>" DA>" DE, whereas empirical realists hâve assumed that DR = DA = DE ; 2) events 
in the actual domain are controlled by mechanisms which exist in the real domain, but 
the real domain is ontologically irreducible to the actual domain. Hence such objects or 
entities as exist at the real level may not be manifest at the actual level or if manifest do 
not always exhibit characteristics such as constant conjunction and regularity of 
occurrence. The mechanisms may exist therefore, entirely independently of us. 3) The 
mechanisms and structures at the real level operate as tendencies which are "in play" 
ail the time but may only occasionally surface when a mechanism is investigated at the 
empirical level. Causality and causal laws then do not concern the identification of 
events in restricted space-time slices, but in volve the analysis of powers or liabilities or 
tendencies that the mechanisms display over time. Since an analysis of causality cuts 
across the three domains of the real, the actual and the empirical, the spécification of 
conditions under which particular events will orwill notoccur islabelled "transfactual" ; 
only the conditions at the real level (the "normic" conditions) will govern whether a 
mechanism is acting in a given manner. Laws do exist but are not always about 
empirical events, they may be considered as "normic, transfactual statements" applying 
to both open and closed Systems. 4) Events are construed as changes in things or 
changes in the structures-in-themselves, not as the sequential replacement of one 
thing or kind of thing by another thing. Hence saying that things hâve powers or 
liabilities is équivalent to saying that a thing possesses a structure and would tend to 
act this way or not tend to act this way if given conditions applied. 5) As above, "mind" is 
taken to be a real émergent power of matter. Entities possess minds if they hâve the 
TOWARD PRAGMATIC REALISM IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 167 
capacity to acquire and manipulate symbols and such capacities or powers are fully 
"causal". Reasons can be considered causes and can be separate from their act 
"performances", but such powers are circumscribed by the acts of others and mechanisms 
operating at the real level. 6) The study of society is the study of relations which exist 
between positions such as places, functions, rules and tasks and practices, the actual 
actions taken by individuals. Society is not just the individuals or the group but 
expresses the sum of the persistent relations in the position-practice System ; agents 
operating in society may or may not be aware of the relational nature of their activities 
hence their actions produce both intended and unintended outcomes. Society then is 
both a condition (a material cause) and a continually reproduced outcome of human 
agency. 
In the wider context of realist thought, it is certainly the case that Bhaskar's 
transcendental realism is not a maximal metaphysical realism. Of the three tenets 
suggested by Putnam, only the first, the independence axiom, would characterize 
Bhaskar's position. But where could we place Bhaskar on the spectrum of realism? 
There are several considérations hère. First, social science is clearly a second order 
type of discourse for Bhaskar and in it judgmental relativism is tolerated and to a 
degree epistemological relativism. This is the case because there is an asymmetry of 
relativism présent: in the domain of the real, things and mechanisms can exist but 
without our knowledge of them. So at the actual level, if we were to act so as to prefer 
one belief over another, eg. some rule or practice over another, this would amount to 
exhibiting a form of judgmental relativism which is defensible. But knowing exactiy 
how the practice in question came to be manifested at one time or place and not 
another is another question entirely — we may only be able to state that, like ail beliefs, 
the one we acted on was socially produced, transitory, theory-ridden, etc. Thus realism 
at the ontological level would not appear to entail judgmental relativism but it would 
entail an epistemological relativism (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 73). However we can go on 
describing tendencies as dépendent on real mechanisms because we/i/c/gre this to be 
the case without ever having to défend why we know it to be the case. Second, it would 
appear that Bhaskar's position on émergent powers materialism is consistent with 
some scientific ontologies. The fact that causality is analyzed "transcategorically" 
does not destroy the argument that some psychological states affect neurophysiological 
states which resuit in action, (since it is a fact that they do), rather it is that Bhaskar has 
analyzed the catégories of existents in a différent manner. In an open System it is simply 
an unanswered question as to which mechanism or structure is responsible for a 
particular event (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 123). Third, explanation in the realist mode is a 
convergent process and quite fallible. Théories develop by analogy to already established 
explanations. During this process, cognitive daims for what inhabits the realm of the 
real will change since 
"theoretical predicates are not isomorphs of essences rather (they are) distanciated and 
multiply connected metaphors embedded in expérience — dépendent and mutable interpré-
tations of more or less formalized structures designed to grasp the mechanisms generating 
some particular range of phenomena" (Bhaskar, 1986, p. 56). 
What émerges from this discussion of Bhaskar's transcendental realism is that it is 
a qualified, anti-positivist realism which is based in the dual notions of ontological 
stratification and émergent powers materialism. As such it is a form of metaphysical 
realism but not a maximal form, since for that to occur (by the définition given above), 
truth would hâve to "intelligibly transcend" évidence altogether ; nothing we could say 
about our material world would be captured in language at ail. Bhaskar believes that 
even though expérience may be larger than the world for us, we can still make 
intelligible statements and hypothèses about that expérience. 
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REACTIONS TO REALISM IN GEOGRAPHY 
Reaction from both the theorists and practitioners of human geography has been 
of a mixed variety, ranging from those who think that realism, in the forms presented to 
us by Bhaskar, Giddens and Sayer, is the "best of the Enlightenment" and "twentieth 
century social theory put together" (Thrift, 1987) to those who think that it will 
"reimport Kantian dualism by the back door" (Smith, 1987) or that it is "failing us 
utterly" since the major components of the realist ontological System are "purely 
imaginary" (Gould, 1987). Still others hâve noted that since realism, like any other 
philosophical stance, can hâve no privileged status, it can only be viewed as some type 
of "looser logic", or a "convenient cover or transition back to old fashioned causal 
empiricism" (Harvey, 1987, p. 368). 
Positive Responses 
In seeing realist thinking take on greater and greater importance in geography, 
there is the hope that there has been (finally ?) a coming of âge for geographical theory. 
Whether one believes that realism began as part of the project to "make modernity 
spatial" (Soja, 1987) or that realism began as a critique of a Marxism incapable of 
incorporating any notions of individual or group agency (Smith, 1987), it is quite clearly 
the case that the realism debate is helping to resituate the whole of geographical 
thinking including the objects, events and meanings that the discipline treats within a 
thoroughly modem philosophical framework. Realism, as a philosophy of science, has 
a very respectable pedigree (Gregory, 1978), and this modem version has forced 
geography to conf ront directly the whole question of how language and belief Systems 
commit us to différent ontological and epistemological programmes. It has therefore 
opened the way for theoretical statements that allow us to make ontological commitments. 
The whole emphasis on "ontological depth" found in modem realism dépends on this 
fundamental starting point. In tum, this ontological depth exploration stands on 
thoroughly modem notions of référence, meaning and truth. Référence is not to be 
construed as "fixed" or "causal" but rather as intentional; there are only empirical 
théories of meaning, there are no "natural" or "intrinsic" théories given by our 
language, and truth is discourse dépendent and "local" (Rose, 1987). 
There are several positive implications which follow from this new emphasis. 
Gregory (1982) pointed out that realism's distinctly layered ontology was a great 
improvement over phenomenologically inspired social constructions of reality (e.g. 
Berger and Luckmann, 1975), since it gave us a properly bounded rather than open-
ended conception of agency. One resuit of this has been that geographers hâve now 
questioned the adequacy of the older "object and event" ontology and begun to 
grapple with the postulation of other, more complex entities such as structure, class, 
state, gender and ethnicity (Cooke, 1987). A second advantage has been that if, as 
realism suggests, we take the notion of human action descriptions as thoroughly 
concept-dependent then much more attention will be given to what our theorizing 
activity actually consists in. Since realism provides for théories which hâve allowed for 
unintended as well as intended conséquences and contingent as well as necessary 
causes, this has allowed geographers not only to see how meaning Systems (and 
language in gênerai) are constitutive of what they study but also it has allowed them to 
go beyond the actor's concepts to a level of critique (Sayer, 1982). 
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Another positive response has resulted f rom the breaking away f rom a very old and 
outmoded version of causality. The whole thrust of realism has been to completely 
refocus our thinking about causality. As long as causality was a property of events, 
such properties could always be conceived of as separate from either the phenomena 
they produce or the individuals involved. But with the realist notion of locating 
causality in objects and treating it as an "émergent power" has corne the more modem 
notion that reasons, beliefs, desires and wants can be causes just as easily as can 
physical causes, and more importantly that causality can be analyzed as a variable 
power not just as a property of events, and that causal powers may or may not émerge 
depending on the relations that individual actors hâve within particular social structure. 
Allen (1983) demonstrates that while realism may not be concerned with each and 
every social object, the value of realism lies in the identification of structured groups of 
individuals who do possess "intrinsic" causal powers, eg. capitalists, landlords and 
family patriarchs. Along with this newer version of causality has corne the attendant 
notion of geographers at work in an "open" System. Regular patterns of events such as 
would be expected to occur in laboratory-like "closed" Systems almost never are the 
rule in human geography, and in such open Systems the emphasis on the study of 
contingent conditions is "unavoidable and is in good scientific tradition" (Sayer, 1987). 
Négative Responses 
Perhaps the most vigorous and substained attack has been on the unobservable 
character of entities postulated to exist in realist theory. Thus Sack (1982) was quick to 
ask why we should believe that structure and mechanisms exist at the'real' level 
especially if the descriptions of that real level are, by the realist view, a product of our 
own theorizing. If such structures do exist, he said, it is science, not our theorizing 
about science that will disclose their nature. Allen (1987) goes f urther to state that such 
entities are just "conjectured" and /Mhey existed, would account for certain types of 
events. But since we are given no guarantee that such entities do exist even at the 
supposed real level, realist theory remains wholly hypothetical and dépendent on the a 
priori transcendental argument to the effect that a particular world, (a possible world 
we might say), would hâve to hâve conditions of the type specified in order that the 
mechanisms with the causal powers would work in the postulated way. Since such 
counterfactual conditions cannot be satisfied at the actual level, — and, in any event, 
the System is "open" — no such conjuncture will ever take place and the best that we 
could ever hope for is some "restricted synthesis of the unique where the powers of 
particular structural mechanisms are overstated" (Allen, 1987, p. 238). For Soja there is 
no "meso-level" between theory and empirical work at which realism can theorize and 
if there were such a level, "there are no deep logics in it" (Soja, 1987). Smith (1987) 
believes that there are the beginnings of a Kantian dualism in that realism lays heavy 
emphasis on theorizing at the expense of ail empirical discussion. He sees no reason 
why the existence of contingent events should prevent us from generalizing about 
them and points to the all-powerful necessary conditions as "barring us from interesting 
gênerai patterns" (Smith, 1987, p. 292). Gould (1987) thinks that without the determinate 
effects of the postulated mechanism in évidence somewhere, the entities at the real 
level are purely "imaginary things posited something like the unconscious in Freudian 
psychology" (Gould, 1987, p. 611). 
A second line of attack has been to state that while causality may be conceived of 
as non-Humean in character, Le., that in a gênerai sensé, reasons can function as 
causes in the explanation of human actions, there is far too much emphasis in realist 
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thought on the notion of contingent causes. Thus Harvey is of the opinion that with the 
judgements of individual researchers dictating which contingencies are the spécial 
ones (those that lead to conjunctures of events in the actual world), any process or 
relation thus described will be entirely unique to that event or constellation of events. 
Eventually, he says, "there is nothing to guard against the collapse of scientific 
understanding into a mass of contingencies..." (Harvey, 1987, p. 373). What then may 
hâve started out as an attempt to employ a genuinely modem version of causality will 
give us only a "theorization of the unique" (Allen, 1987) or a very limited localism 
(Smith, 1987). There is the further danger that with too much emphasis on locality 
studies, (where locale might signify anything from the scale of a room to the scale of a 
nation state), and on micro-spatial processes, there may be the urge to think that the 
whole question of géographie space belongs to the realm of the contingent. 
A third line of critique has centered specifically on Gidden's theory of structuration. 
Gregson (1986) hassuccinctly fashioned this critical account asfollows. While Giddens 
daims that structures underlie action, we never encounter such structures until their 
point of "instantiation" at the moment of individual action; we are never given any 
évidence that such structures hâve a prior existence since we never see them at work at 
the actual level; there is only the daim that they exist. Despite Gidden's lengthy 
treatment of practical consciousness, the knowledgeability of human actors and the 
production and reproduction of daily practices and routines, he gives no real insight 
into the agency side of the "duality of structure". Intentionality on the part of lay actors 
is not wholly incorporated into the transformational model of society and consequently 
the model has nothing in particular to say about when and where either structure or 
agency will dominate (Gregson, 1986). Empirical research might beableto show either 
how agency works on structure, (the / of the ref lexive agent), or how structure works on 
agency, (the constraints imposed by différent locales, time-space paths, budgets, etc.), 
but empirical research cannot show how both will work together to co-produce actions 
in some recognizable pattern. Thus the model of society as a duality of structure is 
ultimately indeterminate and it is doubtful whether we can ever hâve such a co-
produced type of knowledge given that in order to know one side of the duality one 
would hâve to continually "bracket out" the other side, a procédure that can only lead 
to a further methodological dualism. 
What émerges from this list of complaints against realism ? Two points are worth 
noting. First, if realist thinking can be said to be guiding présent theorizing on the 
socio-spatial nexus, then there almost has to be an unruly, damaging tension between 
the "necessary-but-contingent-driven-unobservable-mechanisms-which-produce-
unique-configurations-of-events-in-the-actual-world" and the hope that, at the very 
least, human geography can produce some idea of the processes which pervade whole 
régions of the earth's surface or whole groups of people. This tension between the 
largely idiographic character of realism over against the supposed holism of géographie 
objectives is, of course, not an unnoticed problem (Glick, 1987), but it would appearto 
be one which could simply destroy any ongoing empirical programme for a realist 
geography. In other words, there is a basic conflict between the naïve realism of 
geography, which is satisfied with the study of basic objects and events, and the formai 
properties of any type of metaphysical realism, viz. independence, uniqueness and 
correspondence. Second, at the theoretical level, if realism is to survive as a serviceable 
philosophical stance in geography, it must somehow be disengaged from a vicious 
circularity présent in the argument. While realism seems to hâve provided a continuing 
epistemological justification for the subordination of history to theory, it does this by 
drawing the crucial distinction between necessary tendencies and contingent effects. 
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Since it is our own théories that identify the necessary tendencies in things to behave in 
certain ways and not in other ways, but "whether and how thèse tendencies will 
become manifest in any given time or place dépends on a variety of unpredictable and 
experimentally uncontrollable, contingent conditions", then it can be the case that "the 
real tendencies identified by our théories may or may not be found to operate in 
empirical studies, but our théories assure us that they are there!" (Saunders and 
Williams, 1986, p. 395). We end up with a realist methodology identifying contingent 
conditions "which we already know are in some way mediating the real motive forces 
identified through our theory". Hère there is simply too much a priori included in the 
real, a situation which most investigators would find difficult to défend. What if the 
contingencies cannot be explained except as part of the real? Do they then inhabit 
both realms? Or, more drastically, what if basic catégories such as perceiving, 
knowing and even being turn out to be only contingent ? However one construes thèse 
problems, it amounts to the same question : how does a realist hâve knowledge of 
layers of reality which remain hidden to everyone else? So posed, the question for 
supporters of realist thought has to be to show in some satisfactory way how their 
identification of thèse layers of reality is not due to the postulation of some conceptual 
scheme, some discourse, some state-of-affairs, some external viewpoint or "third 
thing" placed between the world and an observer of it that they (realists) are somehow 
in touch with but the rest of the cadre is not. Without a satisfactory response to this 
question, we would be quite correct to think that realist theorizing is just "there" for 
those who hâve the "right" attitudes or beliefs to appreciate it. For the rest of us it will be 
just so much hand waving. 
PRAGMATIC REALISM 
Pragmatic realism has emerged at a time when many of the doctrines that hold that 
there is some determinate match between the cognizable properties of the actual world 
and the cognizing powers of the mind (such as : foundationalism, positivism, naturalism, 
objectivism, essentialism, the epistemological model, the mirror image, the correspon-
dence theory oftruth) are ail in "wholesale retreat"(Margolis, 1986). Weneedtobelieve 
that a reply to our question, the question posed by transcendental realism, requires 
some commitment to standards of rationality and cohérence. We need to believe also 
that, despite the rise of praxis-oriented stances, the rise of historicity in gênerai and a 
prevailing, if not pervasive relativism, that at least some views on the question of 
realism can be broached and taken seriously, and subjected to criticism and revision in 
the normal fashion. 
If we begin by reaffirming our belief that science does not utterly misrepresent the 
world but then allow that there is no privileged access to the world, we can go on to 
describe a type of pragmatic realism. It is built up out of a séries of four tenets. 
Metaphysical parsimony 
On the whole question of what there is, pragmatic realism counsels metaphysical 
parsimony ; it takes commonsense schemes of what there is at face value without 
helping itself to the notion of the thing /'n/'fse/f (Putnam, 1987, p. 1). Inthis"natural" 
ontological attitude we are committed to the existence of individuals, objects, 
events, properties, relations and processes in our scientific accounts in the exactly 
the same way as we are committed to the individuals, events and features we 
believe to be the case in the everyday world (Fine, 1984). Thus the world is "out 
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there" and it is real (small r) and it does consist of thèse types of existents and 
catégories but because we cannot make intelligible the notion that any conceptual 
scheme (or perfect vocabulary, or intrinsic language, or one fixed view) could 
intervene in any first order way between that world and our utterances about it, 
there are no "essences" of things, no "exact" références, no "final" meanings, no 
"absolutely correct" interprétations "out there". So people and rocks exist, but so 
do mental maps, place-ballets and dominant locales. 
Truth is a semantic category 
There is no sensé in which the truth is "out there" in the way that the world is "out 
there". This is because truth is a property of sentences and sentences are parts of 
languages which in turn are of our own making. As a property of sentences, truth 
will dépend on the warranted assertibility of sentences within discourse and not on 
mind-independent "states-of-affairs". This means that the truth of any sentence 
will be based on the best available arguments, beliefs and judgements and that ail 
truths will be theory-dependent ; it also means that truth is a very "local" property 
in the sensé that agreed upon assertibility conditions for truths far removed in 
space and time from our présent situation will be more difficult to provide. 
Multiple accounts 
Because true descriptions of the world are not out there, multiple accounts of how 
the phenomena in the world work will be justifiable since there will be many 
différent ways in which to arrive at similar accounts of the same phenomena. If 
there is no privileged access to the world, then ail our attendant notions of 
necessity, contingency, référence, meaning and so forth will be empirical ones and 
drawn from restricted, non-totalizing discourses. 
Moral décisions on discourse 
Because there are multiple accounts of how the world is, the pragmatic response is 
pluralist, but because we can distinguish between accounts which are better or 
worse, more useful or less useful, this pluralism does not resuit in runaway 
relativism. 
Compared to our starting position of a maximal, metaphysical realism, the pragmatic 
realism hère proposed is minimal, internai and mitigated as opposed to maximal, 
external and absolute. In terms of the spectrum set out above, it is a type of intermediate 
position between maximal metaphysical realism and anti-realism, perhaps best expressed 
as simply small r realism (see Fine, 1984; Davidson, 1984; Margolis, 1986; Putnam, 
1983, 1987; Rorty, 1982, 1989; Wright, 1987). Can a realism of this type be of use in 
human geography? Presumably, if pragmatic realism can accommodate the realist 
tendencies recently espoused in human geography and if it can do so without the 
objections raised so far, this could lead to some useful middle ground. The following is 
the argument. 
In pragmatic realism the uncapitalized terms "true", "good", and "real" name 
properties of sentences or actions or situations which we ordinarily encounter in our 
everyday lives. Capitalized however, they become TRUE, GOOD and REAL or more 
properly objects which can function as the ultimate goals of our sentences, actions or 
situations (Rorty, 1982). One way in which to see the metaphysical urge in realist 
thought is to see it as the urge to move from some "lower-case" truth or reality to an 
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"upper-case" TRUTH or REALITY. This urge is the notion that there is always more 
truth to be found if we keep looking for it and this, in turn, is based on the belief that 
there is something "out there" called the TRUTH ABOUT THE WORLD which exists 
alongside the world. As Rorty points out, philosophers since Kant hâve been trying to 
rid us of this notion but our enduring essentialism makes us want to say that a sentence 
should not be made true because we say it is so, (or our current best évidence says it is 
so), but because it is TRUE by virtue of corresponding to the way the world REALLY is. 
The metaphysical realist wants to find things or entities in the world that will eventually 
make his version of truth THE VERSION, truth will then be extra-theoretic and 
complète (Rorty, 1982, 1986, 1989). In response to this, pragmatists such as James, 
Dewey, Quine, Putnam and Davidson hâve advanced the daim that this metaphysical 
urge amounts to an attempt to transcend our existence entirely. It is the désire for an 
absolutely external viewpoint, a point from which our world could be compared to our 
théories about it and the disparities and similarities thereby noted. Another way of 
seeing this same urge is to say that a metaphysical realist holds that our language (or 
vocabulary or discourse) "does not go ail the way down" ; hence in some "supercom-
mensurable" VOCABULARY there will be, once and for ail, the REAL REFERENTS, 
TRUTH-CONDITIONS and MEANINGS laid bare. The usual defence of such a position 
is that there is nothing to prevent REALITY from outstripping our conceptions of it ; and 
it would be very presumptuous for us to believe that what we call reality is actually 
REALITY. 
What the pragmatic realist believes that the metaphysical realist does not believe is 
that there is no external perspective from which to view the world and there cannot be 
one; there is no "third thing" between the observer and the world (James), no God's 
Eye View (Putnam), no Conceptual Scheme (Davidson), no Nature's Own Language 
(Rorty)4. It follows that entities or objects cannot exist independently of our conceptions 
of them and moreover, we are the ones who introduce any one or other conceptual 
scheme hence whatever objectivity we may suppose is présent is objectivity for us. And 
"nothing at ail we say about any object describes the object as it is in itself, independently 
of its effect on us" (Putnam, 1981, p. 61). There is no way that our ideasof objects can 
be construed as "copies" of mind-independent things because there is no way to make 
sensé of the notion of some total scheme for the organization of our conceptions 
standing alongside something waiting to be organized by that scheme (Davidson, 
1984). 
Using our example from part I and following Dummett (1978), 
Let P (a proposition) be "X is a cause of E" and, P is not decidable. It follows that : 
1) .'. the condition for P to be true is not recognizable; 
2) .'. there is no situation in which S (some subject) would judge that P is true, if 
and only if P is true; 
3) .". S cannot manifest knowledge of the condition for P to be true; 
4) .'. S does not know the condition for P to be true ; 
5) .'. S can attach no sensé to the supposition that P is true; 
6) .'. truth does not exist independently of our capacity to recognize it; 
7) .'. realism is false. 
Now given that this proposition is exactly that proposed by realists such as 
Bhaskar and that the condition "P is not decidable" correctly interprets the realist 
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phrase "whether or not one knows the nature of the connection between X and E", there 
are definite problems which both the realist and the anti-realist hâve with such 
statements. As Horwich (1982) points out, the move from step 3 to step 4 is less than 
compelling since ail that it would take to understand P is the ability to use it in 
accordance with community norms for judging the degree of confidence it should be 
given. In this situation, manifesting knowledge for P to be true could take place if there 
were a situation in which S would judgePtobe true. Su rely this isquite with in the realm 
of our normal expérience : a landlord, upon being asked by a tenant or group of tenants, 
why the rent has increased replies with a list of quite legitimate, verifiable reasons, e.g. 
the municipal property taxes hâve increased, the service (or water) taxes hâve been 
increased, the building has been reassessed at a higher value and so forth. In such a 
situation P would be decidable to the extent that when landlords act so as to effect E, 
they do so for reasons such as xv x2, x3... xn. For the pragmatic realist thèse are ail quite 
believable in a world consisting of individuals, buildings, municipalities, ratepayer's 
associations, taxes, etc. But he/she does not hâve to postulate a new category of 
existents to handle the fact that reasons can be causes. The metaphysical realist may 
respond that S cannot distinguish xv x2, x3, etc. from the "overall" tendency of 
landlords to increase rents "indiscriminately" or "without reason" or "for the sake of 
profit only". For the metaphysical realist there is no différence between saying "X is a 
cause of E" because the reason was "for the sake of profit only" and saying "X is a cause 
of E" because "X is REALLY there" and "X has the power to act this way". On the 
metaphysical realist's view there is no account given of what it is to know when P would 
be true, but this is not because such an account does not exist, it is because the account 
and the existence of X are ail the same, they are "co-terminus". And further we hâve no 
idea that if X were really "like that", why it should automatically be manifested in some 
particular linguistic behavior in contrast to any other behavior (on the notion that 
mechanisms such as X are quite beyond the powers of our mind to even conceptualize). 
The upshot is that P may or may not be decidable depending on the degree of 
believability and appropriateness that any subject could marshal for his/her account of 
the situation. 
We are then in a strange way driven back to consider what it is about X that makes 
us want to propose it in the first place. While the metaphysical realist wants to deny that 
ail our talk "about X" is in fact talk about how X REALLY is, i.e. he/she would say that the 
truth of realism is not decided by any of our doing but by the world (herein to include 
language), the pragmatic realist can reply that the problem is that we cannot plausibly 
disjoin our theorizing about the nature of existence, truth, référence, meaning and so 
forth from what would be essential to saying how REALISM actually works — we 
cannot throw out en bloc, how we hâve the world and then turn around and make some 
second-order statements about it (Margolis, 1986). We are then caught inthedilemma 
of the "intuitive" realist : one part of us wants to go out and say as a matter of brute fact 
that because there is something ineffable which it is "to be like X", we will simply state 
that the world must be "like that", "hâve X's", and that it is our job to find them. The other 
part of us wants to say that while there may be something that exists, that makes a 
différence, and is real and is différent from what we know about X's so far, saying it is ail 
there is (Rorty, 1982, p. xxix). One way out of thisdilemma isto go with the pragmatist 
response and décide to accept the scientific results of our inquiries in much the same 
way as we décide to accept the results of our everyday expériences. As Fine puts it: 
"I take it that we are being asked not to distinguish between kinds of truth or modes of 
existence or the like, but only among truths themselves, in terms of centrality, degrees 
of belief, or such" (Fine, 1984, p. 96). 
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Accepting this however does not mean that truth-conditions within a spécifie 
discourse are any the less rigid. We can go on to insist that whatever standards of 
warranted assertibility are judged relevant within a given discourse, it will be those 
(agreed upon) standards that are used by académie practitioners in their discourses 
and likewise by laymen in their discourses. If therefore X must exhibit certain necessary 
properties or relations or "not be X" within a given theory (say structuration theory), 
and this is an agreed upon way of defining X, then the assertibility conditions must be 
covered in order that we can say "hère is (some) évidence of X" or "some manifestation 
of X exists". 
Now it would seem that this is not far from the basic position outlined by Bhaskar. 
We noted that Bhaskar's realism was a qualified anti-positivist realism in which a realist 
view of what there is goes together with a science seen as an ongoing social activity ; 
knowledge "cornes out" as a social product even though it may hâve no contact with 
the presumed catégories of existents such as the "transcategorically active mechanisms". 
But what may be more important about Bhaskar's System is that in the end what is real 
is a matter of what is internai to théories, (and this means ail théories, including those 
that daim anything exists outside the domain of the actual). In fact Bhaskar states: 
"Whenever we speak of things or of events, etc. in science we must always speak of 
them and know them under particular descriptions, descriptions which will always be 
to a greater or lesser extent theoretically determined, which are not neutral reflections 
of a given world" (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 249). 
It would seem then that Bhaskar cannot avoid a type of mixed position hère : if 
reality consists of notions of being or world which are completely f ree of our conceptions, 
we cannot then hâve things or events in science under particular descriptions, where 
what is real is internai to those descriptions. The domain of the real may not be 
reducible to the domain of the actual, as a pure matter of faith, but this does not then 
commit us to the absolute noncoincidence of some of our theoretical notions with at 
least some of the properties of the real domain. And if this is allowed, then, to that 
extent, there will be no différence between the domains of the real and the actual. We 
could then adopt this mixed position : realism is the view that reality exists independently 
of our conceptions of it though it may under certain descriptions and théories, coïncide 
with it (Trigg, 1980). To retum to our example, this tactic would then support the view 
that there may be situations in which Pis decidable and hence that X has "something to 
do with E" in a minimal realist way, but that because this is the case within a given 
description, the truth of P is a local truth, and there is no attendant tendency for the type 
of realism hère envisioned to "go metaphysical". In short, in the pragmatic realist 
stance, truth cannot be "aimed at" nor, further, can the process we use to make true 
statements continue with a complète disregard for our ontological commitment. 
Truths will be local, context-dependent and theory-dependent in just the way that our 
best judgments dictate the acceptance of one view rather than another. This "natural" 
ontological attitude is neither realist nor anti-realist in the extrême; individuals, and 
properties and entities ail exist but their existence and characteristics will change as 
our théories change (Fine, 1984, p. 98). This type of realism will not commit us to any 
wide open metaphysical catalogue of existents, such as "self-identifying objects", 
imaginary entities or states-of-affairs which cannot be communicated. But it will 
commit us to an epistemological strategy which is based on the distributed daims of 
science and likewise to the commonsense daims of lay actors as well. It thereby avoids 
the overzealous essentialism or foundationalism often found in metaphysical realism 
yet it makes room for "inspecting alternative, diachronically conservative, gênerai 
regularities or conditions that by arguments to the best explanation are historically 
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judged to be among the best candidates that hâve as yet been found" (Margolis, 1986, 
p. 182). 
The REAL is therefore not something we "get" by seeing "more clearly", by 
hypothesizing "more correctly" or by theorizing "more completely"; ail we get by 
seeing, hypothesizing and theorizing is reality point final. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
The importance of a pragmatic realist response for human geography will consist 
not only of giving high priority to the ongoing work toward an appropriate ontological 
and epistemological location for spatiality (Buttimer, 1990) but it will also serve to 
assert some of the boundary conditions for that very important meta-theoretical 
Project. Certainly one such boundary condition is that the postulated mechanisms 
associated with transcendental realism currently in vogue such as domination, distan-
ciation, hegemony, and flexible accumulation, are under no obligation to inhabit a 
domain of the REAL which is primordially given and thereby hidden from our cognitive 
capacities entirely. The pragmatic realist account of such entities allows our theorizing 
to go forward without the transcendental realm. The catégories of existents that our 
théories and discourse commit us to can be within the domain of the actual and thèse 
catégories need not escape us in any profound way. If this much is accepted for such 
mechanisms, then it will be true for the spatial outcomes of the opération of such 
mechanisms as well. For example, the notions of nodality (where the mechanism is 
distanciation), the notion of territoriality (where the mechanism is hegemony) and the 
notion of uneven économie development (where the mechanism is flexible accumulation) 
are squarely in the domain of the actual. To understand any of thèse spatial outcomes 
we do not need the additional question : what would the world hâve to hâve in the way of 
existents if this outeome were to be the case? To put it another way, there are no 
différent "tiers" of reality which separate people from their mental maps, institutions 
from their dominant locales or whole régions (such as "Sunbelt" or the "Frostbelt") 
from the flexible spécialisation of capital and deindustrialization. 
A second boundary condition for the ontological project confronting modem 
human geography consists of the reaffirmation that, just as the REAL is not a product of 
theorizing at some "higher" level, neither is the SPATIAL. The urge to hâve an account 
of SPATIALITY is the metaphysical urge — we may wish to talk (in certain discourses 
e.g. Soja, 1989) about "the primai setting at a distance" (in Buber) or emplacement (in 
Sartre) or a "positioning in the lebenswelt" (in Husserl) but none ofthis is an account of 
the fundamental features of SPA TIALITY. Such features of spatiality, if we wish to talk 
this way, are "local" features, they are not résidents of some first-order ontological 
System ; they are second-order constructs, they are the product of the human geographer 
and they are in his/her théories about the actual world and nowhere else. 
It would be a reasonable conclusion that compared to the realism on offer from 
theorists such as Bhaskar, Giddens, and Sayer we do not need any version of realism 
which is maximal, externally based and absolute in nature; what we need and ail we 
need is small r realism, realism which is minimal, internally based and (forever) 
mitigated by our expériences in the world. Some will no doubt say that geography, like 
most other sciences, has been "anti-metaphysical" throughout most of its history 
anyway, so that our conclusion would not seem to be very spectacular. But as easily as 
the transcendental is dismissed it has an eerie way of reappearing. One need only think 
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back to several of our récent theoretical pairings such as society-ecosystem, landscape-
text, economy-system, mind-machine, society-class struggle (Harrison and Livingstone, 
1982), and then for the hyphen substi tute the phrase "really is", to see how eager we are 
to apply the metaphysical urge. The shadow of metaphysics is stil l wi th us, it wou ld 
seem, in this latest version of realism. In this sensé the transcendental realist can 
escape the actual wi th ail its problematic percept ions, opin ions and fuzzy beliefs and 
proceed to erect another wor ld , a wor ld that has the sought after degrees of symmetry, 
determinateness and cohérence. That we are guided by such " re l ig ious" urges does 
not seem much in doub t ; what we do and what we say are, however, another story 
altogether. For the pragmatic realist there is no mind- independent reality, no one true 
account of the way the wor ld is and no perfect set of term-to-wor ld correspondences. 
But what if, for the moment, we can do ail the th ings the transcendental realist 
wants us to do wi thout most of the baggage ? What if we need only a litt le realism and 
not a lo t? The pragmatic response to the new realism is just this — ail we need is a 
minimal realism. There is no deep sensé in which reality escapes us entirely and there is 
no deep sensé in which the transcendental realm names for us the work ings of our 
everyday wor ld . The cont inued pressing of either of thèse d a i m s is not just myster ious, 
it is empty. Geography can profi t f rom a little realism ; it wil l be doomed by a lot. 
NOTES 
1
 The relevant texts are : Bhaskar (1975,1979,1986), Harré (1986), Giddens (1979,1984), and 
Sayer (1982, 1984). 
2
 While it is true that much of the "realist-inspired" literature in geography owes much to 
the work of Giddens and Sayer, it is perhaps easier to grasp the fundamental tenets of realism by 
limiting the discussion hère to Bhaskar's very explicit form of realism. Obviously there are no 
complète overlaps between thèse three authors but there is a sensé in which Bhaskar's realism 
forms a very solid theoretical base for the "tacit" realism of Giddens and the "révisable" realism 
employed by Sayer. 
3
 However there hâve been a multitude of realisms in philosophical thought : 1 ) the représen-
tative realism of Descartes and Locke in which material objects as the ultimate objects of 
perception are distinguished from private sensa, the mental effects of those objects on the sensé 
organs; 2) naive realism, the view that ail of our normal suppositions based on our sensé per-
ceptions are correct ; 3) the "new" realists of the early twentieth century (Holt, Marvin, Montague) 
arguing for a complète return to Platonist thought particularly for mathematical entities; and 
4) the critical realists (Sellars, Lovejoy, Lewis) arguing that our sensé perceptions are not actually 
part of the external objects but are character complexes taken at the moment of perception to be 
characteristic of the external objects. 
4
 As Davidson puts it : "Nothing, however, no thing makes sentences and théories true ; not 
expérience, not surface irritations, not the world, can make a sentence true. That expérience takes 
a certain course, that our skin is warmed or, that the universe is finite, thèse tacts, if we like to talk 
that way, make sentences and théories true" (Davidson, 1984, p. 194). 
And for Putnam : "There is no God's Eye point of view that we can know or usefully 
imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests 
and purposes that their descriptions and théories subserve" (Putnam, 1981, p. 50). 
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